framework in which the technology gap is reflected in the change of technology parameters. Our measure is related to but differs from the Malmquist index. We determine the parameter values for country technology by using calibration procedures. Our calculations suggest that the technology gap between China and the U.S. is significantly larger than that between India and the U.S. for the period before 2008 . The pairwise gaps between the U.S. and China, and the U.S. and India remain large while narrowing at a slower rate than GDP per worker. Although China has a higher growth rate of total factor productivity than India over the period, the bilateral technology gap between China and India is still in India's favor. India had higher income per worker than China in the 1970's, and China's much more rapid physical and human capital accumulation has allowed China to move ahead, but a bilateral technology gap remains.
Introduction
In this paper, we report calculations of the technology gaps between China and the U.S. as well as China and India between 1979 and 2008 using a CES production framework. A technology gap is defined as the difference in output using foreign technology and domestic (or foreign) factors relative to output using domestic technology and domestic (or foreign) factors. Our measure is related to but differs from the Malmquist productivity index discussed by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a, 1982b ). An advantage of using the technology gap measure instead of the Malmquist productivity index is that our concept is flexible to the structure of the aggregate production function, and can be conveniently generalized to include technological improvements embodied in the production function besides the multiplicative productivity factor (for example, technological improvements due to a change in the substitution elasticity or factor-augmenting technological change in a CES production function, or increasing returns to scale).
Our results suggest that although China has a higher growth rate of total factor productivity than India over the period, the bilateral technology gap between China and India is still in India's favor. India had higher income per worker than China in the 1970's, and China's much more rapid physical and human capital accumulation has allowed China to move ahead, but a bilateral technology gap remains. Also, we find that the technology gap between China and the U.S. is significantly larger than that between India and the U.S. for the period before 2008. The pairwise gaps between China and the U.S., and India and the U.S. remain large while narrowing at a 4 slower rate than GDP per worker.
The paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief background related to our analysis in Section 2, and discuss the technology gap concept and the methodology we apply in Section 3. We describe the data sets we use in Section 4, and present our empirical results in Section 5. As a comparison, and also for robustness purposes, we report technology gap calculations for the widely used Cobb-Douglas case in Section 6. We offer concluding remarks in Section 7. 5
Background
A major development in the world economy over the last quarter of the 20th century has been strong economic growth and poverty reduction in both China and India. The Penn World Tables show that the real GDP (or real GDP per worker) in 2008 was almost 14.6 (or 9.4) and 5.3 (or 2.9) times that in 1979 for China and India respectively, while the same number for the U.S. was 2.3 (or 1.6). 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 China and India's large economic size combined with rapid growth has meant that their economic rise has had large impacts on the global economy, although their absolute income levels are still quite low (the real GDP per worker of China and India in 2008 were about 12.9 and 9.2 percent of that of the U.S., respectively). Recent literature analyzes China and India's growing presence in the world economy (see Wang, Medianu & Whalley (2011) for related discussion), and also conducts comparative growth accounting studies for these two countries (see Herd & Dougherty (2007) and Bosworth & Collins (2008) , for example).
It is widely recognized that technology or efficiency is at least as important as physical and human capital accumulation in explaining income differences across different countries (Hall & Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005) . Since the Cobb-Douglas specification is the most widely used for the aggregate production function, differences in technology or efficiency across countries can be simplified as TFP (Total Factor Productivity) differences, or in other words, can be summarized by the multiplicative factor A. Howitt (2000) and Klenow & Rodríguez-Clare (2005) show how large TFP differences can emerge in a world with slow technology diffusion from advanced countries to other countries, while Hsieh & Klenow (2009) estimate the effects of resource misallocation on China and India's manufacturing TFP and find that if capital and labor are hypothetically reallocated to equalize marginal products to the extent observed in the U.S., the TFP could be boosted by 30%-50% in China and by 40%-60% in India.
But as Caselli (2005) emphasizes, the Cobb-Douglas specification is key to the literature explaining income differences across countries, and a generalization of the TFP assumption from Cobb-Douglas to CES (constant elasticity of substitution) specification can lead to major changes in results. Notably, there has been increasing recent empirical evidence that rejects the (unitary-elasticity) Cobb-Douglas specification in favor of CES (generally below unity substitution elasticity) aggregate production functions (see Chirinko et al. (1999) , Duffy & Papageorgiou (2000) , Chirinko (2008) , and Klump et al. (2007 Klump et al. ( , 2011 , for example).
It is also noteworthy that China's real GDP per worker did not surpass that of India until the year 1998 to 2000 (as shown in Figure 2 ). We can conjecture naturally that the more rapid accumulation of physical capital in China (as shown in Figure 3 ) may suggest a lower technology level for China compared to that of India at least before the middle of the 1990s. 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Methodology
In this section we set out the methodology we use to measure the pairwise technology gaps between China, India and the U.S. over time. We measure the technology gap between two economies 1 and 2 in terms of the ratio between actual output in economy 1 using economy 1's technology and inputs, and hypothetical output using economy 2's technology with economy 1's inputs. Specifically, we can write the production function as follows: 
We can then define the technology gap between economies 1 and 2 as the ratio of hypothetical to actual output in economy 1: 
And we can define the reverse technology gap as:
If we use a CES production function with Hicks-neutral technological change (2)- (3) and (5)- (6), we have:
We can thus calculate the technology gaps 12 G and 21 G as in equations (4) and (7).
Similarly, for the CES production function with factor-augmenting technological (13) and the Cobb-Douglas production function 14) we can also calculate the technology gaps 12 G and 21 G using equations (2)- (7).
Our definition of technology gaps is related to but differs from the Malmquist productivity index, a widely used productivity measure developed by Caves,
Christensen and Diewert (CCD) (1982a, 1982b ). An advantage of using the technology gap measures 12
G and 21 G set out above rather than a Malmquist productivity index is that our concept is flexible in the structure of the aggregate production function, and can be conveniently generalized to include technological improvements embodied in other parts of the production function besides the multiplicative productivity factor
(for example, improvements due to a change in the elasticity of substitution or factor-augmenting technological change in a CES production function, or increasing returns to scale). It is also worthy of note that if the aggregate production functions of the two economies [as equations (9)- (10) or (11)- (12) . As Bjurek (1996) mentions, to establish a relationship between the productivity indices and the corresponding Malmquist indices, CCD made the assumption that the underlying technologies were translog with equal second-order parameters. Although CCD (1982b) showed that their superlative index numbers could also be used to make multilateral output, input and productivity comparisons, if we allow for different assumptions on the production technologies, the productivity index might not be expressed easily in terms of a quantity index.
For a CES production function with Hicks-neutral technological change as in equation (8), or a CES function with factor-augmenting technological change as in equation (13), the key issues in calculating the technology gap measures 12 G and 21 G are how to parameterize the corresponding production functions by the observed data of the two economies, and specifically, for the production function equation (8) how to parameterize the two equations (9) However, estimation of restricted translog functions or utilization of the Kmenta approximation has been proved unsuitable when the underlying CES function differs from the Cobb-Douglas form (Thursby & Lovell, 1978; Henningsen & Henningsen, 2011) . Results based on using nonlinear optimization techniques in many cases seem not to be stable; while the estimation of the supply-side system presented by Klump et al. (2007) encounters problems of data availability. As a result, the calibration approach is now the more commonly used method in recent literature (Caselli, 2005 ).
Since we also compare results from different forms of production function (a Cobb-Douglas function and a CES function with Hicks-neutral or factor-augmenting technological change) or different values of the elasticity of substitution, considering the number of experiments we report on in this paper, we adopt the calibration approach.
We specify as our benchmark a CES production function with Hicks-neutral technological change that also incorporates human capital. As in Caselli (2005) , we use a Hall and Jones' (1999) formulation for human capital
where it K is the aggregate capital stock of economy i at time t , it L is the corresponding number of workers, it h is their average human capital, and it it L h can be interpreted as the "quality adjusted" workforce.
In per-worker terms the production function (15) can be rewritten as (4) and (7)].
In order to calculate the technology gaps of interest here using a CES production function with Hicks-neutral technological change as in equation (16) 
Data Sets for China, India and the U.S.
The data sets used in this paper combine variables from two different sources.
The first is Version 4.0 of the Extended Penn World Tables (EPWT version 4 Recent empirical evidence suggests that the U.S. and other developed economies should be better represented by a CES aggregate production function with an elasticity of substitution below unity rather than the unitary-elasticity Cobb-Douglas specification (Chirinko, 2008; Klump et al., 2007 Klump et al., , 2011 . While according to Duffy & Papageorgiou's (2000) estimates, elasticity of substitution with human capital adjusted labor could be lower than estimates without human capital. As a result, we set as a benchmark the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 8 .
The distribution parameter i  in a CES aggregate production function [in per-worker terms as in equation (16) 
Where 0  is the capital share at the reference point, and  is a efficiency parameter.
With equations (24) and (25), we can then express equation (16)  of these countries will become 1, and the differences in efficiency or technology level will disappear. Using the data presented in Figure 4 , we can also parameterize equation (26) (2007) and Bosworth & Collins (2008) . The estimated efficiency parameters The technology gaps of China and India both with the U.S. and with each other calculated using equations (17) and (18) are shown in Figure 5 [ it ŷ and it y are calculated from equation (26) India's input factors were hypothetically used with China's technology, the hypothetical output would also be lower. Note that since we assume the aggregate production functions of all the three economies [as equation (26) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Table 1 , i.e., different reference points or reference countries do not change the trends described here.
Empirical Results
These findings are noteworthy, since recent literature emphasizes the much higher growth rate of total factor productivity in China than in India, and misses China's comparatively lower technology level compared to India.
Robustness Checks
For comparative purposes, we also present results calculated using an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function
We use U.S. data on the capital share for i  again, i.e., we again use its long-run average value Table 1 at Section 5). Thus the only difference between the Cobb-Douglas production function used here and equation (26) Comparing Figures 4 and 6 , we can see that these two figures give similar trends: the growth rate of technological change in China is higher than India, and the latter is still higher than that of the U.S; while both the technology levels (measured by the efficiency level indices in the figures) of China and India are much lower than that of the U.S., the technology level of India is higher than that of China. Our previous conclusion that the technology gap is in favor of India before 2008 since the initial gap is in India's favor still holds. The major difference between Figures 4 and 6
is that with a Cobb-Douglas production function, efficiency level indices are slightly lower, and the rates of technological change are slightly higher for China and India than that for the CES case in Section 5; while for the U.S., the contrary is true. For comparative purposes, we also present results with different reference points (China, India and U.S. data in 1979) in Table 2 . As shown in Table 2 The technology gaps of China and India both with the U.S. and with each other calculated with a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function are shown in Figure 7 [ it ŷ and it y in equations (17) and (18) Table 3 .
Results in Table 3 show that, for China and India, the efficiency parameters 
Conclusion
Our paper reports calculations of the technology gaps for China and India compared both to the U.S. and to each other between 1979 and 2008 using a CES framework. These gaps reflect differences between actual output per worker and hypothetical output using other countries' technology with domestic inputs. By comparing with the U.S., we investigate changes in the technology gaps between China and India through time, and also make comparisons of the efficiency or technology level of the two countries.
We find that the pairwise gaps between China and the U.S., and India and the U.S. remain large while narrowing at a slower rate than GDP per worker. The technology gap between China and the U.S. is significantly larger than that between India and the U.S. for the period before 2008. Notably, the variations of China and India's technology gaps relative to the U.S. present different behavior. The technology gap for China relative to the U.S. is narrowing much more rapidly than India. The calculations we report here also suggest that although China has a much higher growth rate of total factor productivity than India over the period, the bilateral technology gap between China and India is still in India's favor. India had higher initial income per worker than China in the 1970's, and China's much more rapid physical and human capital accumulation has allowed China to move ahead, but a bilateral technology gap remains.
These findings are noteworthy, since it seems that in the existing literature little attention is paid to the technology gap between China and India. Recent literature seems more inclined to emphasize the much higher growth rate of total factor productivity (or technological change) in China than that in India, and thus misses China's comparatively lower aggregate efficiency or technology level compared to India.
